TANZANIA Vol. I

(2)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
9	Report	Tanzania	1/14/70	B
12	Telegram 2758	Dar es Salam to Secstate	9/23/72	B
38	Cable	Tanzania/Uganda	10/21/71	B
39	Cable	Tanzania/Uganda	8/27/71	B
40	Cable	Tanzania/Uganda	8/26/71	B
41	Cable	Tanzania	11/4/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

745

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6203

August 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania that the appointment of Mr. Paul Lazaro Bomani as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

Dispatched 8/21/72 (rb)

6203

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania that the appointment of Mr. Paul Lazaro Bomani as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Office of Chief of Protocol/State
General Haig
~~NSC Files w/incoming~~
WH Files (Roberts) w/incoming
WH Central Files w/incoming
HAK chron.

FERondon:mm
August 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6203

CONFIDENTIAL

August 16, 1972

FOR: Jeanne Davis

FROM: Fred Rondon FR

SUBJECT: Agrement - Paul Bomani - Ambassador to the US from Tanzania

Attached is a memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of State concurring in the appointment of Paul Bomani as Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United States.

Att.

OK
JRT

CONFIDENTIAL

6203

7213435

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

August 15, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Paul Bomani as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United States. A biography of Mr. Bomani is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Respectfully,

William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Biography.

The President,
The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 16, 1972

MURF:

In that Mr. Kissinger is out of the country and has been this week, we must be careful not to date and dispa5ch HAK signoff's.

In the case of the attached agrement, we are even unable to backdate the memo--sealed in t he envelope--since rogers sent it only ~~y~~ eesterday.

steve

Congrats to Steve!

THE WHITE HOUSE 6203

WASHINGTON

August 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania that the appointment of Mr. Paul Lazaro Bomani as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

H. A. Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
8/15	8/15 20	6203	Rondon

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ✓ KISSINGER ____ HAIG ____

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS, W X LAIRD, M ____

U ____ LOU ✓ C ____ 'S ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ BUO ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODE WORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS ____ EXDIS ____ LIMDIS ____ RES DATA ____

SUBJECT: Request from the Government of Tanzania regarding concurrence in Paul Boateng as Envoy to the US

REFERENCE: S/S 7213435 OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

APP'TS: PRES ____ HAK ____ TALKER ____ MEMCON ____ DATE REQ. ____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	[redacted]		
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	X		(X)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (____)
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... (____)
REPLY FOR ____ SIGNATURE ..... (____)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... (____)
MEMO ~~HAK~~ TO Rogers for Davis (X)
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (____)
JOINT MEMO ..... (____)
REFER TO STATE ..... (____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... (____)
CONCURRENCE ..... (____)
DUE DATE: 8/20

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*
Follow S.P. reqmts.

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
8/16	PR	~~NSC~~ DOV	S.	Concurrence (8/16)	
8/16				HAK Sgd Memo to Rogers	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH ____ NOTIFY ____ DATE ____
SEE LOG ____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO to Sec State done
JOINED BY LOG ____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ~~ABOVE~~) inside
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: Rec'd cy to Chf of Protocol, State done
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ✓ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
DO ____ INIT ____ DATE ____
ORIG. ____ NSC ✓
TO) PAF ✓
WHC ____
SUBF ____
AUG 23 1972

☆ GPO: 1972-455-927

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC-34313

CONFIDENTIAL

November 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Representative at 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence (S/S 7117425)

To confirm our telephone notification, the President designates Ambassador Claude G. Ross to represent the United States at the Tanzanian 10th anniversary celebration.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Dispatched @ 1935 12 Nov with outside rcpt.
Cys to Wright, Stan Anderson & HAK Chron. rj

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(34313)

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

ACTION

November 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT: Delegation to the 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence

Some time ago Tanzania routinely invited the U.S. to send a two-man delegation to Dar Es Salaam for the December 9 celebration of Tanzania's 10th anniversary as an independent state. Secretary Rogers had earlier suggested Secretary Morton as the head of the delegation. However, Morton cannot go. Secretary Rogers has therefore written you a memo (Tab A) suggesting that the delegation consist of our Ambassador to Tanzania and the publisher of the Philadelphia Tribune, Mr. Eustace Gay. Secretary Rogers does not recommend a more impressive delegation, in view of the Tanzanian performance on the Chirep vote.

As you know, it was the Tanzanian delegation which danced in the aisle and led the cheering. Frankly, I see no reason why we should, at this juncture, send anyone from the United States to Dar Es Salaam for their ceremony. I suggest that you simply designate our resident Ambassador, Claude G. Ross, as your representative to the anniversary observances.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you designate Ambassador Claude G. Ross as your representative to the Tanzanian independence ceremonies. (Mr. Kingsley's office concurs.)

Approve _____

Disapprove. Also designate Eustace Gay as member of the delegation. _____

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7117425
34313

November 2, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence

Tanzania has invited us to send a two-man delegation to the 10th anniversary of its independence on December 9, 1971. The delegation would remain in Dar es Salaam for three days.

I had previously suggested Secretary Morton be named to head our delegation. Although he had hoped to go, other commitments have now precluded his participation. In the light of the unfriendly reaction of the Tanzanian delegation in New York following the UNGA vote on the Chinese representation issue, I now believe that it would be inappropriate to recommend that a person of Cabinet rank head the delegation. I therefore would like to suggest that the delegation consist of our Ambassador to Tanzania, Claude G. Ross, and Mr. Eustace Gay, publisher of the Philadelphia Tribune.

Recommendation:

That you designate Ambassador Ross and Mr. Gay to represent the United States at the Tanzanian 10th anniversary of independence celebration.

William P. Rogers

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (34313)

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

November 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright MW

SUBJECT: Presidential Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzania's Independence

December 9 is Tanzania's 10th birthday. They have invited us to send a two-man delegation to the ceremonies. Earlier Secretary Rogers had suggested Secretary Morton as the President's Rep. Now, Morton cannot go. Moreover, in view of the Tanzanian performance on Chirep, Rogers no longer believes it appropriate to send a high-level rep. He therefore suggests the President designate our Ambassador to Tanzania, (Tony Ross) and the publisher of the Philadelphia Tribune (Eustace Gay) as the delegation.

I see no reason to send anybody from the United States to Dar Es Salaam for this event. I suggest instead that we simply designate our Ambassador there. Attached is a memo to the President so recommending.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you initial the memo to the President at Tab I.

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
11	2	11	3	10	34313	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
KISSINGER
HAIG

FROM: ELIOT
ROGERS, W X
LAIRD, M

U
LOU
C X
S
TS

LOG IN/OUT ONLY
NO FORN — NODIS
BUO — EXDIS
EYES ONLY — LIMDIS
CODE WORD — RES DATA
SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Low-Key Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence on Dec 9

REFERENCE: S/S 7117425 OTHER NOT XEROXED

APP'TS: PRES HAK TALKER MEMCON DATE REQ.

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY		X	
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	X		X
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. (X)
REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
MEMO TO ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
REFER TO STATE ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE: 11/9

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
11/4	Cooj Ex	HAK	X	Pres for decision (11/10)	
11/9	HAK	Pres	P	Decision	
				Pres Approved Reco	
		Davis	S	notify State (11/13)	
11/12				Davis signed memo to Eliot	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH 32119 done. NOTIFY DATE

SEE LOG DISPATCH: ~~LETTER/MEMO~~

JOINED BY LOG COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) S. Anderson

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO

MICROFILM DATA
DO
INIT
DATE
ORIG)
TO)
NSC
PAF
WHC
SUBF

NOV 17 1971

★ GPO: 1971—412-412

32119

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 17, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence (S/S 7113358)

The President has approved the designation of Interior Secretary Morton and Ambassador Claude Ross to represent the U.S. at the 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

MICROFILM DATA
DO ✓
INIT
DATE
SEP 20 1971
ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF X
WHC
SUBF

CONFIDENTIAL

The Following Pages Are the Best
Available.

9/17 Davis sgd memo to Eliot

— to Eliot

ECC/80/SHLD

Note: Despatch; m/f and add to package

MEMORANDUM

SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 32310

September 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER INFORMATION

FROM: Marshall Wright MW

SUBJECT: Tanzania View of Chirep

Cabot Lodge has sent you a memo (Tab 1) to report the views of MasonSears, an Eisenhower appointee to UNESCO, who recently met with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Sears told Lodge:

-- Nyerere, who knows Chou En-lai well, says that Chou is obviously going to bargain for UN membership but is very anxious to get in.

-- There are 40,000 Chinese in Tanzania. (Our highest estimates are 20,000; Sears offers no basis for his figure.)

Our primary reason for bringing this to your attention is just so you will know that Lodge wrote to you, when next you talk with him.

HK

Clearance:

John Holdridge

Attachment
Tab 1 - 9/8/71 Lodge to Kissinger letter.

32310

SECRET

Beverly, Mass.
September 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger

FROM: H. C. Lodge H.C. Lodge

SUBJECT: Julius Nyerere's Assessment of Chou En-lai's Innermost Convictions regarding Chinese Membership in the United Nations

1. Mason Sears, the U.S. Representative on the UN Economic and Social Council in the Eisenhower Administration, has just returned from a trip to Tanzania where he had a long talk with Nyerere, with whom he has had a friendship going back to 1953.

2. Sears said that Nyerere knows Chou En-lai extremely well and had had long talks with him at a meeting in Algiers some two years ago. At that time, Chou had said: "We want definitely to be in the United Nations." Nyerere recalled that Peking was very cold to the effort of Sukarno and other Bandung countries some time ago to start an organization which would be a rival to the UN. Nyerere concluded: "Chou is very anxious for his country to be in the UN." This, of course, does not mean that there will not be much bargaining, Chinese style.

3. Nyerere told Sears that he thought he understood the American position on the China question. In particular, he understood that the United States must stand by its commitment to Taiwan.

4. Sears says that relations between Tanzania and Peking are very close: there are 40,000 Chinese in Tanzania who are building the railroad to bring copper from Zambia to the sea; there is a Chinese military mission; and the country is full of Chinese goods.

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
5	8	9	8	14	3x310	Hold. /Wright

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER X HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____ LODGE, Henry Cabot

U _____ LOU _____ C _____ S X TS _____

NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SUBJECT: Mason Sears Conversation with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania re Chou-En-lai views on China

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST	X		
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS	X		
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (X)
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... ( )
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... ( )
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT ~~MEMO~~ Action ..... (X)
REFER TO STATE ..... ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE: 9/14

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
9/9/71	MW	FR		do a draft - get EA Concurrence. Very fuzzy, just so ~~HAIG~~ will know HCL wrote him. MW	
9/10		HAK	C/X	Info. Thanks / HAK	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ____ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA

DO _____ INIT _____
DATE _____
ORIG) NSC _____
TO) PAF _____
WHC _____
SUBF _____

SEP 14 1971

★ GPO: 1971-412-412

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

32119

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

September 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT: Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence

Secretary Rogers has recommended at Tab 1 that Secretary of the Interior Morton represent the United States at the ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of Tanzanian independence on December 9. He would share the honor with our Ambassador to Tanzania, Claude Ross. The UK, PRC and Canada are also expected to send high-level delegations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you designate Secretary Morton and Ambassador Ross to represent the United States at the Tanzanian 10th Anniversary of Independence. Daniel Kingsley concurs.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab 1 - Secretary of State's memo to the President, September 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

H - There are good occasions to reward some one who wants to be called "Mr Ambassador" — You will recall Roosevelt's appreciation when we did it for him

PRESERVATION COPY

7113358
33119

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence

Tanzania has invited us to send two delegates to the 10th Anniversary of its independence on December 9, 1971. The delegation would remain in Dar es Salaam for three days. The United Kingdom, Peoples' Republic of China, and Canada are expected to send high-level delegations.

I know of your desire to have other members of the Cabinet visit Africa on suitable occasions. Because of the long tie between the U.S. National Park Service and the Tanzanian Park Service, and the arrival in September of an important delegation representing the Tanzanian National Park Board, I believe Secretary Morton would be a particularly good selection to head our delegation. Several other governments are expected to name their resident representatives as one of the delegates. In order not to undercut our Ambassador to Tanzania, Claude G. Ross, I believe it would be appropriate to name him as the second delegate.

Recommendation:

That you designate Secretary Morton and Ambassador Ross to represent the United States at the Tanzanian 10th Anniversary of independence.

William P. Rogers

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

File

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT: Designation of Ambassadors

On the occasion of approving Dr. Kissinger's memorandum to the President of September 9 that Secretary Morton and Ambassador Ross be designated to represent the United States at the Tanzanian Tenth Anniversary of Independence, it was noted that these are good occasions to reward some of those who want to be called "Mr. Ambassador." The appreciation expressed by Mr. Frank B. Rachley when he was appointed to fulfill such a responsibility was pointed out by the President as a good example. (Mr. Rachley was appointed as Personal Representative of the President and Special Ambassador to help celebrate the Tenth Anniversary of the Federal Republic of Cameroon.)

Thank you.

cc: Daniel Kingsley
Alexander P. Butterfield

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE (32119)

WASHINGTON

Retype

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT ACTION

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence

Secretary Rogers has recommended at Tab 1 that Secretary of the Interior Morton represent the United States at the ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of Tanzanian independence on December 9. He would share the honor with our Ambassador to Tanzania, Claude Ross. The UK, PRC and Canada are also expected to send high-level delegations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you designate Secretary Morton and Ambassador Ross to represent the United States at the Tanzanian 10th Anniversary of Independence.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____.

Attachment

Tab 1 - Secretary of State's memo to the President, September 1.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 32119

CONFIDENTIAL

September 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

ACTION

FROM: Marshall Wright MW

SUBJECT: Delegation to 10th Anniversary of Tanzanian Independence

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the attached memorandum (Tab A) to the President. Daniel Kingsley concurs.

Done 9-8-71 jeg

Attachment - Tab A.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Ed,

Pls add to your 22772 package

Tom

22653
22 992

13936

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 16, 1970

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cancellation of President Nyerere's October 16 Call on the President

As you know, the President agreed on October 14 to receive Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere at 10:30 a.m. October 16. The White House invitation was immediately relayed to President Nyerere's advisers in New York.

On the morning of October 15 the Tanzanian Ambassador called from New York to advise the Department that his President regretted very much that prior commitments in New York on the morning of October 16 made it impossible for him to accept the President's kind invitation. He asked that his appreciation as well as his regrets be relayed to the President.

Ted L.

for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

N.A.R
MW

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~[illegible]~~
4610

7 [illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 17478
CONFIDENTIAL

November 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Official Visit by Tanzania's President Nyerere

The Secretary's memorandum of October 21 to the President recommended that Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere be invited to pay an official visit to the United States in early April 1970. If this recommendation is approved by the President, it is suggested that Assistant Secretary Newsom be authorized to extend the invitation on the President's behalf when he visits Dar es Salaam in mid-December.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

IBRD - Study August 31, 1967
Prospects for Economic Development in East Africa

INDUSTRY IN TANZANIA

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. In recent years industrial production, starting from a very low level, has increased rapidly. During the six years 1960 to 1966 the value added by manufacturing and processing increased on the average by 16.4 percent per annum at current prices and probably at the rate of 12 percent in constant prices. In the same period manufacturing increased its share in monetary GDP from 4.4 percent to 6.8 percent. In contrast, the contribution of mining to GDP declined from 4.2 percent in 1960 to 3.6 percent in 1966 even though the annual rate of growth in this sector averaged 5.4 percent in current prices.

2. The processing of local agricultural products and the manufacture of goods in substitution for imports account for nearly all of the increase in output. Import substitution has been marked for such products as textiles, cement, beer and petroleum products; and it is possible to relate specific reductions in import volume in recent years to the initiation of domestic production. While there will be some growth in export-oriented processing industries, import substitution will probably continue to account for much of the growth in the manufacturing sector.

3. This record of growth and diversification does not mean that Tanzanian industry has everywhere reached a high standard of productivity and economic efficiency. There is much variation between different sectors in this respect. However, some industries such as beer, tobacco and cement are competitive with duty-paid imports from outside East Africa and the meat canning industry is competitive in world markets. That there are areas of low productivity and high prices is understandable. Initially entrepreneurs have been primarily interested in taking advantage of an already existing market supplied by imports paying certain duties, and under these circumstances they have usually not been under immediate pressure to reduce costs. Moreover, in the initial phases of industrialization, it would be unreasonable to expect new industries to achieve maximum efficiency right from the start.

4. In recent years, Tanzanian manufacturing has not developed in a balanced fashion viewed from a regional standpoint. In 1965, Dar es Salaam alone employed 43 percent of all Tanzania's employment in manufacturing. Industry has developed primarily in or near Dar es Salaam because the latter is the seat of government, the principal port, the commercial and banking center and affords the largest single market. However, industrial development is now spreading to other regions. Several industries started production in Arusha-Moshi in 1965 and 1966, and the textile industry is developing in Mwanza. This indicates that despite transportation costs, lack of infrastructure and other serious problems, there are economic advantages which attract industry to Arusha or Mwanza, i.e., lower labor costs, new markets and the availability of raw materials.

5. Industry was accorded high priority in the 1964-69 Development Plan. The latter envisaged that altogether £57 million or 23 percent of total development expenditures would be invested in manufacturing, processing and mining. Of this total, £15 million was to be invested by the public sector and £42 million by the private sector.

6. Public sector investment is likely to fall substantially below the target. In the first two years of the Plan - 1964/65 and 1965/66 - public expenditures on industry were only £2.3 million or about 15 percent of the projected total. A large project for the development of coal and iron ore failed to materialize and there was a lag in public investment in processing facilities. The Government accordingly revised the five-year investment target to £6.8 million, involving an expenditure of £4.5 million in the last three years of the Plan. However, the Mission estimates that no more than £3.7 million is likely to be spent. Total public investment would therefore not be more than £6 million.

7. On the other hand, investment in the private sector has developed favorably. The Mission has estimated that such investment in the 1964-69 period may reach £47 million, or £5 million more than the original target, although this estimate may now have to be scaled down somewhat in consequence of the nationalization measures announced in February 1967. The Mission expects that, largely as the result of this private investment, the value added by manufacturing and mining may well reach £31 million by 1970 as compared with about £17 million in 1965.

8. In the past the Government sought to stimulate investment by a variety of measures. These included the extension of a special investment allowance of 20 percent, facilities for rebates of import duties on components and raw materials used in manufacturing and assurances to "approved" foreign enterprise of the right to repatriate profits and capital and to obtain full compensation in the event of nationalization. In recent years the Government has also fostered domestic manufacturing by imposing quantitative restrictions on imports from Kenya and Uganda following the Kampala Agreement of April 1964; and while these restrictions cannot be maintained after the new Treaty for East African Co-operation becomes effective in December 1967, they can be to some extent replaced by "transfer duties" authorized by the Treaty.

9. After the suppression of the army revolt early in 1964, there was a gradual increase in investor confidence which was strengthened by the pragmatic economic policies of the Government and the stress laid by the Plan on development of the private sector. Investment almost doubled between 1964 and 1966 and although this was in large part due to "lumpy" investments in oil refining and cement, considerable capital was also invested in many small and medium industrial establishments. However, industrial enterprise was unfortunately almost entirely confined to the local Asian community and European investors, since conditions have not been favorable to the rapid emergence of individual African entrepreneurs and African cooperative enterprise has not developed beyond the simple processing of agricultural products.

10. The nationalization measures of February 1967 came as a shock to the business community which had come to believe in large part that previous emphasis on "African socialism" and government "control" of the economy would not necessarily lead to public ownership of industry. The measures taken apparently stemmed from a twin desire to Africanize the economy and to establish a "people's socialism." In industry the nationalization was much more limited in scope than that of commercial banking. The eight flour and rice mills that were completely nationalized probably account for less than 10 percent of the total net output of manufacturing and processing industry; and the seven larger enterprises in which the Government decided to acquire an interest up to 60 percent contribute perhaps 20 percent to 25 percent of current and projected production. However, taking into account the public and

quasi-public participation which already existed, the Government has estimated that cooperatives and enterprises in which it has taken a majority interest now control between 45 and 50 percent of net processing and manufacturing output.

11. The impact of nationalization on output and investment is as yet difficult to assess, particularly in quantitative terms. There was a temporary setback to production which had, however, been apparently surmounted by mid-1967. The Mission's projections of output to 1970 may still be realized, since they largely rest on investments already undertaken or committed. They are, however, contingent on good management of the enterprises which have been partially or wholly nationalized. The Government has made arrangements for the continuation of the previous management of undertakings it has completely nationalized and appears anxious to make the same arrangements for those in which it has taken a majority interest.

12. New investment commitments, however, may be adversely affected by the nationalization measures, and this would obviously have repercussions on output in the longer run. The Government has definitely declared that no further nationalization will take place and that private enterprise and investment will be welcomed in the future, though usually in partnership with the state. Evolution of the actual investment climate will depend on a number of factors. One will be the terms of compensation which in the great majority of cases still have to be worked out. Another will be the extent to which the Government will insist on majority ownership and control of new ventures. Private enterprise will probably welcome state participation, but it may well be difficult to obtain a significant amount of private risk capital for enterprises in which the Government has in principle the power to dictate investment and management decisions. As in the past, there will presumably continue to be opportunities to get foreign "private investment" in the form of suppliers' credits, but these are unlikely to be an adequate substitute for risk capital which gives the investor a more active and direct interest in the success of the enterprise.

INDUSTRY IN TANZANIA

I. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANZANIAN INDUSTRY

1. The economy of Tanzania is firmly based upon the production of primary produce. Manufacturing and mining production are small in relation to the economy as a whole. Thus in 1966, the net output of the manufacturing sector comprised but 5 percent of domestic product, including subsistence; and mining contributed only about 2.6 percent of GDP.

2. The structure of industrial production in Tanzania is loose knit, without a high degree of interindustry dependence. Production is largely concentrated on the industrial processing of primary products and the manufacture of consumer goods. The first includes grain and oil milling, food products and beverages. In 1965, about a quarter of employment and labor earnings in manufacturing fell in this category. The second consists of the manufacture of such consumer goods such as cigarettes, textiles, leather goods, furniture and woodworking products.

3. Tanzania has also developed in recent years some metal products industries (aluminum, steel galvanizing) and has now an oil refinery and a cement plant. Tanzania has rich deposits of noncoking coal, and iron found near Lake Nyasa, but development of these resources cannot begin until their mining is economically feasible. The establishment of heavy industry in Tanzania must await a significant expansion in the market which may come in time, as further progress in industrial development creates a demand for intermediate and capital goods and produces the "external economies" conducive to additional growth.

4. Interindustry sales are not a common feature of the industry in Tanzania, but there are a few firms which exist to serve the requirements of local industry. Some examples of such satellite industries are the manufacture of metal containers for the meat and fruit canning, the production of sisal bags for the cotton industry, the supply of packing materials for the consumer goods industries and of cement to the construction sector.

5. In 1966, food processing and manufacturing employed about 29,900, and mining and quarrying 6,200. The total of 36,100 is slightly over one-tenth of the number of persons in paid employment. A listing by broad categories, together with employment figures, is given in Appendix Table I.

6. Most of the establishments are small. The average wage bill per establishment was only £14,800 in 1965. 1/ Appendix Table II gives details on the size of establishments in that year. There were only 12 enterprises with more than 300 employees in manufacturing, and 5 in mining. The average labor force in manufacturing establishments was 20 workers. However, this figure is partly misleading since only 12 firms, each with more than 300 workers, employed 25 percent of the total labor force, whereas almost half of the workers were employed in 918 establishments with less than 50 employees. In certain industries such as beverages, footwear, grain milling and engineering, there is the curious dichotomy of a handful of large

---

1/ In 1965, cash earnings paid to employees amounted to £4.9 million and the number of establishments in manufacturing was 1,025.

capital-intensive enterprises existing side by side with small family concerns.

7. These two distinct types of production units really form noncompeting groups, as the small producers are usually situated in rural areas serving isolated communities outside the range of the large enterprises located in Dar es Salaam. In the metal mining, salt, sugar, beverages and metal goods industries the five largest producers control over 90 percent of the gross output. This relatively small number of larger firms is engaged in the production of such items as cans, canned meat for export, vegetable oil products, wheat, flour, beer, tobacco, cement, oil refining, aluminum rolling. A major part of the value of manufacturing output is accounted for by this category. Using fairly advanced techniques and employing a relatively high ratio of capital to labor, a number of these firms are owned and managed by overseas enterprises, mostly of British origin. In several cases the investment in Tanzania represents the branching out of an enterprise already established in Kenya. During recent years the bulk of new investment in manufacturing, which has increased from the level of £3-4 million in 1960-1963 to £8-10 million a year in 1965-1966,1/ has gone into these relatively large firms.

8. To summarize, the ownership of industries in Tanzania has been almost entirely European and Asian except for some crafts, a small public sector and the quasi-public or cooperative sector.2/

9. The two main factors that have governed the location of industries have been access to raw materials and markets. Industries which are concerned with the processing of primary produce such as the ginning, sugar refining, wattle extract and oil milling industries tend to be located near the source of their raw materials. The location of the consumer goods industries, however, is largely determined by the pull of the market. Small-scale consumer goods industries such as bakeries, tailoring, woodworking and footwear tend to be spread throughout the country with a concentration proportional to the demand for their product. The large-scale consumer goods industries, with a few large firms controlling the major proportion of output, tend to gravitate to those areas which offer good communications and a high market density, i.e., large purchasing power per unit of area.

10. The growth areas seem to be Dar es Salaam, the Moshi-Arusha area, the area around the shores of Lake Victoria and the Tanga region. These areas, where a large part of the population is located, contain the vast majority of

---

1/ In particular due to investments in oil refining and cement.

2/ Essentially in food processing activities.

industrial establishments in Tanzania.1/ Nearly all the industries which are not situated in the above four growth areas are either primary processing concerns which must be close to their raw material supplies or small-scale consumer goods industries.

11. In the Lake region, where prosperity is largely based on cotton, leading manufacturing industries are the cotton ginning and milling industries. The principal mining fields in Tanzania also lie in this region. The Northern region, where Moshi and Arusha are located, is comparatively wealthy, primarily owing to the development of cash crops (coffee, sugar, wheat). As a result there are several industrial establishments in the region which process these crops. There is a coffee-curing factory at Moshi which processes all the mild coffee grown in the country. A sugar factory is located near Arusha and a large modern grain mill produces wheat flour. A modest industrial complex comprising a variety of new consumer goods industries (beverages, clothing, leather goods, textiles, printing) is developing in the Arusha-Moshi area. In addition, Arusha is the site of a Meerschaum pipe factory which obtains its raw material from a mine near the Kenya border.

12. The Tanga region's economy is based on sisal. It is also the major timber-producing area in the country, with the sawmilling industry concentrated around Korogwe near the source of its raw material supply. Consumer goods industries such as soft drinks, woodworking and textiles have been attracted to the area.

13. In 1965, 43 percent of the population employed in manufacturing worked in Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam is the real center of manufacturing industry in Tanzania. The large-scale modern factories in the consumer goods industries such as grain milling, beverages, tobacco and footwear are nearly all located in Dar es Salaam, since the city not only offers the biggest market but also has transport facilities radiating to other areas. The dominance of Dar es Salaam is most marked in secondary industries including manufacture of metal products, textiles and cement and the refining of petroleum. This is partly due to the fact that Dar es Salaam is the principal port in the country and industries which consume a large quantity of bulky imported products tend to be situated on the coast to keep transport to a minimum. Dar es Salaam will continue to be the major growth point in the economy because it is the seat of government, has banking and commercial services, provides an organized market and possesses essential transport facilities.

II. THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1964-1969)

14. Of the total capital expenditure of the Five-Year Plan (1964-1969) amounting to £246 million, some £57 million or about 23 percent was allocated to industry. The Plan gave greater emphasis to industry than the preceding Three-Year Plan 1960-1963. Table 1 shows the targets for net output and investment.

1/ See Appendix Table VI. Out of 1,025 manufacturing enterprises, 701 were located in these four regions in 1965.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 9 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

STATE DEPT OF STATE
AUG 23 AM 8:11

SECRET 199

PAGE 01 DAR ES 02848 221650Z 2

55
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 022904

R 221105Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3831
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 2848

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS (2)
TAGS: PINR PINT UG TZ
SUBJECT: UGANDA COUP PLANS

REF: NAIROBI 5577

1. AS WASHINGTON ENDUSERS UNDOUBTEDLY KNOW, JULIAN HILBERT IN PARA 4 REFTEL UNDOUBTEDLY COL. HUBERT FAUNTLEROY JULIAN, NOTORIOUS "BLACK EAGLE" WHO MADE HIS REPUTATION INITIALLY WITH ETHIOPIAN FORCES DURING ITALIAN WAR AND WHO MORE RECENTLY TRIED SELL ARMS IN NIGERIA CIVIL CONFLICT.

2. HE IS "CASH ON THE BARRELHEAD" OPERATOR AND ASSUMPTION WELL TAKEN THAT HIS ASSISTANCE "WILL DEPEND UPON THE LIBERATOR'S ABILITY TO RAISE FUNDS".

3. JULIAN ALSO HAS WELL-KNOWN PENCHANT FOR LOOSE DISCUSSION OF HIS MANY ATTEMPTED ADVENTURES.
CARTER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 FEB 8 AM 9:38

CONFIDENTIAL 730

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00419 071542Z

53
ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 016617

R 071119Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2475

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 0419

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT AID ADMINISTRATOR ADAMS

SUBJECT: TANZAM RAOD PROBLEMS AND DCI

1. BECAUSE OF GROWING EMBASSY CONCERN OVER MOUNTING TANZAM ROAD PROBLEMS AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS VIS A VIS US/TANGOV RELATIONS, I ASKED MY DCM AND ECON OFFICER TO MEET WITH AID DIRECTOR GREEN AND REGIONAL ENGINEER MACDONALD ON TUESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY. BECAUSE I FEEL IT VITAL YOU HAVE BENEFIT OF FULLEST BACKGROUN ON DCI AND RAOD PROBLEMS, I AM TRANSMITTING FULL BUT UNCLEARED AND IN-HOUSE MEMCON OF THIS MEETING FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. IT MAY BETTER HELP YOU UNDERSTAND MISSION CABLE 0416, WHICH YOU SHOULD NOW HAVE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: "MACDONALD EXPLAINED DCI BASICALLY UPSET OVER TWO MATTERS: AMENDMENT TO TUNDUMA LYAYI CONTRACT AND EXTENSION OF DAR-MOROGORO CONTRACT.
"TUNDUMA-IYAYI: MAJOR PROBLEM IS THAT ROBISON, FORMER CHIEF OF DCI TANZANIA PARTY, MADE NUMBER OF ORAL AGREEMENTS RE BRINGING IN EXTRA STAFF AND OTHER EXPENSES. DCI WISHES TO REGULARIZE POSITION BY WRITING AGREEMENTS INTO EX POST FACTO AMENDMENT. TANGOV REFUSING LIABILITY. SUBSIDIARY PROBLEM IS POSITION OF ARLEN BENNS, HEAD OF DCI GROUP WHICH SUPERVISED TUNDUMA-LYAYI SECTION. BENNS IS NOW WORKING ON FINAL REPORT AND PREPARING DOCUMENTS FOR ARBITRATION. HE IS STILL BEING PAID OUT OF PROCEEDS FROM AID LOAN. THE MEMENT HIS FINAL REPORT IS FINISHED, USAID STOPS HIS FUNDING. TANGOV WILL HAVE TO BEAR ANY FURTHER EXPENSES INVOLVED IN PREPARING FOR ARBITRATION.
"DAR-MOROGORO: AS RESULT OF FURTHER LOAN NEGOTIATIONS NLT CONTRACT

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00419 071542Z

THIS SECTION HAS BEEN EXTENDED 16 MONTHS BEYOND ORIGINAL TERMINAL DATE. DCI CONTRACT HAS NOT BEEN AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR THIS EXTRA EXTENSION OF TIME. MATTER HAS BEEN UP IN THE AIR SINCE MID-MARCH, 1972. DCI APPARENTLY WANTS USAID (T) TO GET TANGOV TO MOVE ON THIS QUESTION; USAID (T) BELIEVES IT DCI PROBLEM AND REFUSES TO INTERVENE. NEITHER TANGOV NOR DCI INACTIVITY FULLY EXPLAINED IN MEETING BUT ONE PROBLEM MAY BE THAT DCI PROPOSED CONTRACT AMENDMENT CONTAINS ADDITIONAL OVERHEAD COSTS PAYMENTS. NEW COSTS JUSTIFIED BY USAID SPONSORED AUDIT AND DCI SEEMS TO FEEL THAT USAID HAS SOME SORT OF MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP THEM ATTAIN THIS ADJUSTMENT. IN BELATED EFFORT MAKE TANGOV MOVE ON THIS ISSUE, DCI (CHICAGO) NOW HAS FOR CLEARANCE LETTER DRAFTED BY LOCAL DCI OFFICE INFORMING TANGOV THAT DCI INTENDS TO START DEMOBLIZING STAFF IN ORDERLY PHASE-OUT AND WILL PULL OUT LAST PEOPLE ON APRIL 1. MACDONALD SAYS THAT AT THAT TIME UNDER TERMS OF LOAN AGREEMENT USG HAS NO OPTION BUT TO STOP PAYMENT ON ANY FURTHER CONSTRUCTION ON ROAD UNTIL SUPERVISVMING ENGINEERS ARE ON JOB AGAIN. MACDONALD/GREEN FEEL THAT THIS IS DCI/TANGOV PROBLEM AND THAT USAID SHOULD KEEP HANDS OFF MATTER AND LET DCI PLAY OUT THEIR SCENARIO. NEITHER GREEN NOR MACDONALD WERE ABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON THE JUSTIFICATION WHICH DCI WILL USE TO SUPPORT ITS CHARGE TO SENATOR PERCY OF LACK OF USG COOPERATION IN TANZANIA.

"OVERLOADS: MACDONALD HAS DRAFTED A LETTER TO TANGOV WHICH MAKES OUR PROTESTS ABOUT OVERLOADS ON THE HIGHWAY A MATTER OF RECORD AND APPARENTLY DISCLAIMS ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROAD FAILURE WHICH WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IF TANGOV DOES NOT TAKE ACTION TO ENFORCE WEIGHING PROCEDURES. MACDONALD ALSO SAID THAT UNLESS STEPS TAKEN NOW IT QUITE PROBABLE THAT SIGNIFICANT SECTION OF NEW ROAD BETWEEN DAR ES SALAAM AND MOROGORO WILL FAIL IN UPCOMING LONG RAINS. EROSION UNDER ASPHALT BASE IS PROBLEM; IT CAN BE SOLVED BY PUTTING A DIFFERENT TYPE OF SOIL IN THE AREAS OF EROSION AND BY PLANTING GRASS ON THE SHOULDERS TO LIMIT WASH-AWAY. MACDONALD PREDICTED TO DCI LAST YEAR THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN, BUT DCI WAS ADAMANT AND MACDONALD FELT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO STEP ASIDE AND LET IT HAPPEN." END TEXT

3. FYI. THE MATTER OF THE DURABILITY OF THE ROAD IS BEING INCREASINGLY RAISED BY TANGOV OFFICIALS AS THEY CAN VIEW THE WASH-AWAY AS ONE TRAVELS TO TANGA, MOSHI OR ARUSHA. MIN/DEVPLAN CHAGULA TOLD ME YESTERDAY FOLLOWING MEETING ON OTHER MATTER THAT HE HAD SEEN THIS EROSION JUST LAST WEEK AND THAT HE AND OTHER MINISTERS WERE CONCERNED THAT ROAD MIGHT NOT HOLD UP FOR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FORM

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DAR ES 00419 071542Z

EVEN "SIX MONTHS". HE DEPLORED WHAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD MEAN IN TERMS OF TANZANIAN VIEWS OF "AMERICAN EXPERTISE". I MUST CONFESS THAT I HAVE FAILED TO TALK TO ANYONE YET (ADMITTEDLY, MOST OF US ARE NON-PROFESSIONAL) WHO FEELS CONFIDENT ABOUT THE STATE OF CONTRUCTION ALONG THIS PARTICULAR STRETCH. END FYI.

4. I AM NOT SHARING THE MEMCON OR THIS CABLE WITH THE AID MISSION HERE.
XGDS
CARTER

CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 12 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 010

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01687 141210Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

102788

'72 JUN 14 PM 3:08

R 141015Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1187
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 1687

EXDIS

SUBJECT: OBOTE DEMARCHE

REFERENCE: STATE 105495

EMBASSY DAR HAS NO INFO ON REF SUBJECT. GP-3
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 853

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01566 021039Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 020900Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1117

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 1566

EXDIS

FOR P AND EUR

REF: STATE 96887

1. NO OFFICIAL, PRESS OR RADIO COMMENT ON PRESIDENT'S TRIP OR ANY OF AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH SOVIETS. MEDIA COVERED VISIT WITH ONE OR TWO COLUMN-LENGTH ARTICLES EACH DAY BUT NEVER IN HEADLINES AND USUALLY ON INSIDE PAGES.

2. I WAS ABSENT FROM TANZANIA UNTIL FINAL DAY OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO SOVIET UNION BUT DCM INFORMS ME HE ENCOUNTERED NO QUERIES OR COMMENTS BY TANGOV OFFICIALS. OTHER DIPLOMATS HERE, WHO HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN VISIT, HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR SURPRISE AT LACK OF ANY OFFICIAL TANGOV REACTION.

3. I MET FOR HOUR WITH FONMIN MALECELA ON OTHER MATTERS MAY 31 AND SPOKE WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE BRIEFLY AT OPENING OF US FACTORY SAME DAY. NEITHER MENTIONED OR ASKED ABOUT MOSCOW VISIT.

4. TANGOV NON-REACTION (WHICH ALSO MARKED PRESIDENT'S EARLIER TRIP TO CHINA) PROBABLY REFLECTS (A) GENERAL RELUCTANCE TAKE STAND ON BILATERAL BIG-POWER RELATIONSHIPS, (B) MARGINAL INTEREST IN SUBJECTS OF CONFERENCE WHICH DO NOT APPEAR DIRECTLY AFFECT EITHER TANZANIA OR AFRICA, (C) CURRENT PREOCCUPATION WITH OWN DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND PURELY

'72 JUN 2 PM 12:10
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
011736

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 01566 021039Z

AFRICAN ISSUES (SUCH AS OAU SUMMIT PLANNED FOR NEXT WEEK IN RABAT). I WOULD GUESS THAT, IF PRESSED FOR COMMENT, SENIOR TANGOV OFFICIALS WOULD EXPRESS SATISFACTION AT ANY STEPS AIMED AT REDUCING ARMS RACE AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, AND THAN ASK WHETHER MOVES LIKELY IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR GREATER AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY GREAT POWERS.
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

h10 | e0 | Sh10.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 697

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01497 251121Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 085554

R 250915Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1080

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN DAR ES SALAAM 1497

EXDIS

SUBJECT: STROH/SIEDLE

REF: KAMPALA 1527; STATE 91248

1. EMBOFF HAS REVIEWED TAPERECORDING OF MARTIN'S INTERVIEW WITH TIBIHIKA. MURDER PARTY IDENTIFIED BY TIBIHIKA WERE (SPELLING PHONETIC): LT. STEPHEN TABANE, LT. SAMWE, LT. MOSES, AND LT. ALI (LAST REPORTED TO BE YOUNGER BROTHER OF COL. ALI). CONCEIVABLY NAME JONES HAS IN MIND IS LT. MOSES (MUSA) ALTHOUGH TIBIHIKA IDENTIFIED LATTER AS LT., NOT CAPT. TIBIHIKA DID NOT IDENTIFY MOSES BY FIRST NAME OR INITIALS NOR DID HE INDICATE HE WAS CHIEF OF MURDER PARTY. NO "CAPT. JUMA" MENTIONED ANYWHERE IN INTERVIEW ALTHOUGH MAJOR JOMA, OF COURSE, FIGURES PROMINENTLY AS MAN WHO ORDERED KILLING.

2. TIBIHIKA APPEARED IN EMBASSY TODAY AFTER PREPARATION ABOVE ASKING FOR HELP IN GETTING JOB. EMBOFF TOOK OPPORTUNITY QUERY HIM ON LT. MUSA. TIBIHIKA SAYS FULL NAME IS LT. MUSA SAFI. GP-1
KREISBERG

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 696

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00993 181231Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 058875

O 181000Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 862
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 993

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TIBIHIKA DEPOSITION IN STROH-SIEDLE CASE

REFERENCE: DAR ES SALAAM 985; STATE 066374.

DEPOSITION DELIVERED TO EMBASSY MORNING APRIL 18. WILL BE POUCHED APRIL 19 AS PER SCHEDULE IN DAR REFTEL. WILL BE ADDRESSED EYES ONLY OFFICER IN CHARGE.
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 914

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00985 171525Z

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W
---------- 050725

O 171230Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0857
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 0985

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TIBIHIKA DEPOSITION IN STROH/SIEDLE CASE

REF/ KAMPALA 1078; STATE 64426

1. WILKINSON DEPARTING DAR ES SALAAM 1415 APRIL 17 WITHOUT RPT WITHOUT TIBIHIKA DEPOSITION. EARLY MORNING OF 17TH TIBIHIKA BALKED AT SIGNING DEPOSITION AFTER DISCUSSING HIS POSITION WITH A LOCAL LAWYER. TIBIHIKA WAS ADVISED THAT SIGNING DEPOSITION EQUVALENT TO SIGNING SWORN CONFESSION HE ACCESSORY TO MURDER AFTER FACT.

2. WILKINSON REPORTEDLY ARGUED WITH TIBIHIKA ALL MORNING AND FINALLY GOT HIM TO AGREE TO SIGN DEPOSITION ONLY TO DISCOVER IT NOON HOUR IN DAR ES SALAAM AND HE UNABLE FIND AN OFFICIAL EMPOWERED TO ADMINISTER OATHS AND WITNESS DOCUMENT.
3. WILKINSON FELT OBLIGED CATCH 1415 PLANE SO HE LEFT DEPOSITION WITH CORRESPONDENT DAVID MARTIN WHO WILL UNDERTAKE TO HAVE TIBIHIKA SIGN DEPOSITION IN FRONT OF MAGISTRATE LATER THIS AFTERNOON. MARTIN HAS NOW URGENTLY REQUESTED US TO POUCH DEPOSITION FROM HERE IF HE SUCCEEDS IN GETTING IT SIGNED. NEXT COURIER POUCH LEAVES HERE 1330 LOCAL APRIL 19 AND ARRIVES KAMPALA 1300 LOCAL FRIDAY 21ST. ASSUME PERMISSION TRANSMIT DOCUMENT CONTAINED STATE REFTEL STILL STANDS EVEN THOUGH CIRCUMSTANCES SOMEWHAT ALTERED.
4. FOR RECORD WE WISH REPORT THAT ON AFTERNOON SUNDAY APRIL 16 WILKINSON APRROACHED EMBASSY THROUGH MARTIN TO ASK URGENT A

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00985 171525Z

IN HAVING DEPOSITION TYPED AS PROFESSIONAL STENOGRAPHIC HELP UNAVAILABLE. BELIEVING SUCH ASSISTANCE IN SPIRIT OF STATE REFTEL WE ARRANGED HAVE AMBASSADOR'S SECRETARY PICK UP HAND WRITTEN NOTES AT WILKINSON HOTEL ROOM, TRANSCRIBE THEM ON STATIONERY PROVIDED BY MARTIN AND RETURN FINAL COPY TO WILKINSON. OPERATION CARRIED OUT WITH UTMOST DISCRETION.
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL

L19/20/SHLO

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 449

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00837 072307Z

67
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 116730

O 070909Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0812

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0837

EXDIS

REF: DAR 0828, DAR 0835

FOLLOWING TEL RECEIVED FROM KAMPALA ON APRIL 7TH : REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE

O 071307Z APR 72 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM NIACT IMLEDIATE

S E C R E T KAMPALA 0981

EXDIS

SUBJECT: STROH/SIEDLE CASE

REF: DAR 828

1. APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPTLY ADVISING ME OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, WHICH, IF LIEUTENANT'S STORY CAN BE CORROBORATED, MAY PROVE TO BE DECISIVE TURNING POINT IN CASE.

2. MUCH AS WE WOULD LIKE TO, WE CANNOT CHECK OUT VEHICLE/BODY LOCATIONS OURSELVES AND, IN FACT, WITH CONCURRENCE DEPARTMENT WE ARE STAYING AT ARM'S LENGTH FROM JONES COMMISSION HEARINGS IN ORDER NOT TO BE PLACED IN POSITION OF BEING PROSECUTORS OF GOU.

3. STILL, I THINK IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF WE COULD GET DAVID MARTIN'S STORY TO THE COMMISSION BEFORE OBSERVER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00837 072307Z

STORY APPEARS, TO GIVE COMMISSION CHANCE TO CHECK IT OUT BEFORE EVIDENCE IS FURTHER DISPOSED OF. AFTER MULLING OVER POSSIBLE SCENARIOS I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT BEST MEANS WOULD BE TO HAVE YOU SUGGEST TO MARTIN THAT HE INFORM JONES COMMISSION, IN PERSON COMMISSION COUNSEL WILKINSON, OF HIS STORY, ASKING LATTER TO KEEP INFO CONFIDENTIAL PENDING PUBLICATION IN OBSERVER BUT GIVING WILKINSON CHANCE TO CHECK OUT TWO LOCATIONS BEFOREHAND. YOU AND I WOWLD SERVE AS SECURE TRANSMISSION CHANNEL BETWEEN MARTIN AND WILKINSON AFTER RECEIVING ASSURANCES FROM BOTH THAT OUR INTERMEDIARY ROLE WILL BE KEPT MOST CONFIDENTIAL.

4. IF YOU CONCUR, SUGGEST YOU REPEAT YOUR 828 AND THIS MESSAGE TO DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATE AND EXDIS AFTER RECEIVING DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE YOU COULD THEN APPROACH MARTIN WITH SUGGESTION OUTLINED PARA 3 ABBVE. WHEN YOU ADVISE ME OF MARTIN'S AGREEMENT I WOULD APPROACH WILKINSON. SINCE WE OUGHT TO TRY TO GET THIS WORD TO WILKINSON BY SATURDAY I'M AFRAID THE IMMEDIATES WILL BE FLYING, FOR WHICH I APOLOGIZE IN ADVANCE.

5. FYI. BODY LOCATION ACCORDS WITH REPORT WE RECEIVED LAST JULY. CAR LOCATION IS NEW TO US AND THEREFORE EVEN MORE WORTH CHECKING OUT. END FYI.
FERGUSON UNQUOTE
ROSS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

810|E0|SHLO

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 328

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00835 072142Z

62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 072000Z APR 72 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE NIACT 0810
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE NIACT

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0835

EXDIS

SUBJECT: STROH/SIEDLE CASE

1. I AM REPEATING IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SEPTELS SELF-EXPLANATORY EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES ON STROH/SIEDLE CASE BETWEEN EMBASSY DAR AND EMBASSY KAMPALA ON WHICH AMBASSADOR FERGUSON AND I REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S URGENT INSTRUCTIONS.

2. SINCE RECEIVING KAMPALA'S 981 I HAVE HAD ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH MARTIN WHO TOLD ME HE HAS HAD HIS INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT AND IS FILING STORY TONIGHT FOR SUNDAY OBSERVER. MARTIZ SAID THAT FOR OUR PURPOSES STORY'S VALUE MAY BE LESS THAN HE ANTICIPATED AS LIEUTENANT CLAIMS BODIES WERE SO BADLY DECOMPOSED HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY THEM OR EVEN CONFIRM THEY WERE WHITES. HE STATED COL. ALI TOLD HIM THEY WERE "THE AMERICANS".

3. I DISCOVERED FROM MARTIN HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH FREE LANCE JOURNALIST IN KAMPALA WHO, WITHOUT ASKING MARTIN, LET HEAD OF JONES COMMISSION KNOW THAT MARTIN HAD EYE-WITNESS STORY. IN CIRCUMSTANCES I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO ASK MARTIN WHETHER HE WOULD AGREE TO OUR PASSING STORY TO COMMISSION. I EXPLAINED OUR ROLE WOULD HAVE TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND DEPARTMENT WOULD HAVE TO AUTHORIZE IT. MARTIN SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE US PASS ON HIS BEHALF AND IN CONFIDENCE THAT PART RELATING TO LOCATION OF VEHICLE AND BODIES SO COMMISSION COULD CHECK IT OUT BEFORE STORY PUBLISHED, BUT HE WOULD OBJECT TO REST OF INFORMATION BEING PASSED TO COMMISSION AHEAD OF PUBLICATION. HE STATED, HOWEVER, HE INTENDED HIMSELF TO TELEX TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW TO HEAD OF COMMISSION SATURDAY

1972 APR 8 AM 10 52
116100

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00835 072142Z

NIGHT APRIL 8. MARTIN ALSO PROMISED TO GIVE US COPY OF
TAPED INTERVIEW.
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

610 | 60 | SHLO

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 431

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00828 072244Z

67
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W
116570

O 072030Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0811

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0828

EXDIS

REF: DAR 0835

FOLLOWING TEL SENT TO KAMPALA ON APRIL 7 REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE

O 062030Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0828

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM AMBASSADOR ROSS

SUBJECT: STROH/SEIDLE CASE

1. DAVID MARTIN, LOCALLY-BASED BRITISH CORRESPONDENT WHO HAS BEEN RELIABLE SOURCE FOR US DURING PAST FEW YEARS, HAS JUST COME TO US WITH FOLLOWING STORY.

2. FROM FORMER HEAD OF UGANDAN GENERAL SERVICES NOW LIVING IN TANZANIA MARTIN HAS LEARNED THAT A UGANDAN ARMY LIEUTENANT OF MBARARA BATTALION ESCAPED TO TANZANIA SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AND JOINED UGANDAN EXILES AT CAMP NEAR TABORA. THIS LIEUTENANT CLAIMS COLONEL ALI ORDERED HIM TO DIG UP BODIES OF STROH AND SEIDLE FROM SHALLOW GRAVE NEAR MBARARA, BURN THEM AND DISPOSE OF REMAINS. AFTER HE HAD DONE SO COLONEL ALI ORDERED HIM TO BURN AND DISPOSE OF THEIR CAR WHICH LIEUTENANT SAID ALI HAD BEEN DRIVING AROUND FOR SEVERAL DAYS AFTER STROHAND SEIDLE DISAPPEARED. IN THIS CONNECTION LIEUTENANT RECALLED THAT ONE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00828 072244Z

NIGHT COLONEL ALI WAS SHOUTING AT OFFICERS' MESS ABOUT "FUCKING AMERICANS WHO WERE AROUND ASKING QUESTIONS". LIEUTENANT QUOTED ALI AS SAYING: "WE'LL SHOW THEM THEY CAN'T GET AWAY WITH THIS KIND OF THING." NEXT DAY LIEUTENANT YAW ALI DRIVING AMERICANS' CAR.

3. LIEUTENANT IS NOW IN CUSTODY OF TANGOV HERE IN DAR. THROUGH NYERERE'S PRESS SECRETARY MARTIN HAS ASKED PRESIDENT'S PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW LIEUTENANT TOMORROW. IF PERMISSION GRANTED, AS MARTIN EXPECTS IT WILL BE, MARTIN INTENDS FILE STORY FOR SUNDAY EDITION OF LONDON OBSERVER (WHICH I UNDERSTAND HAS ABOUT 100 AMERICAN OUTLETS). LIEUTENANT REPORTED TO BE UNDERSTANDABLY WORRIED ABOUT MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY STILL IN UGANDA, AND MARTIN INTENDS GET MESSAGE TO THEM TO LEAVE IF INTERVIEW COMES OFF.

4. IN GIVING US ADVANCE WORD MARTIN ASKED WE HOLD STORY IN ABSOLUTE SECRECY UNTIL IT BREAKS IN SUNDAY OBSERVER. THIS I AGREED TO DO BUT SAID I WOULD CABLE YOU IN ORDER GIVE YOU OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO LOCATE CARCASS OF STROH/SEIDLE VEHICLE BEFORE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES GET WIND OF STORY AND GET IN YOUR WAY. I HOPE YOU HAVE ENGINE NUMBER OR OTHER MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION.

5. LIEUTENANT HAS REPORTEDLY GIVEN FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS FOR LOCATING VEHICLE: QUOTE GO FROM FORT PORTAL TO KICHWMABAGA TECHNICAL SKHOOL. CONTINUE ON MAIN ROAD BEYOND TECHNICAL SCHOOL. GO DOWN HILL ON MAIN ROAD. GO UP ANOTHER (SECOND) HILL AND ON GOING DOWN THIS HILL HALF WAY DOWN ON RIGHT HAND SIDE JUST BEFORE MINISTRY OF WORKS CAMP THERE IS A VALLEY. CAR WAS BURNED AND PUSHED INTO THAT VALLEY UNQUOTE.

6. ONLY INFORMATION MARTIN HAS AT THIS POINT ON WHERE WHATEVER ARE REMAINES OF BURNED BODIES WAS DUMPED IS FOLLOWING: QUOTE GO FROM MBAR RA TOWARD FORT PORTAL. TEN TO ELEVEN MILES FROM MBARARA ON LEFT HAND SIDE OF ROAD IS A VALLEY. REMAINS WERE DUMPED IN VALLEY UNQUOTE. LIKELIHOOD OF YOUR FINDING ANY USEFUL TRACE AFTER SO LONG A TIME WOULD SEEM TO BE EXCEEDINGLY REMOTE, BUT YOU DAY WISH TO HAVE THIS INFORMATION CHECKED OUT TOO.

7. WE SHALL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MARTIN AND ADVISE YOU

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 DAR ES 00828 072244Z

IMMEDIATELY OF ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OR INFORMATION THAT MAY COME TO LIGHT. MEANWHILE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON WHAT YOU MAY EVENTUALLY WANT FROM LIEUTENANT IN WAY OF DEPOSITION AND HOW IT SHOULD BE HANDLED.
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 679

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00652 091103Z

10
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 090750Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9020

'71 MAR 9 PM 12:57
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
002257

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 652

EXDIS

REF: STATE 36080

1. AS PROPOSED IN DAR 605 AND AUTHORIZED BY REFTEL, I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE YESTERDAY ON OTHER SUBJECTS TO MENTION US GENERAL INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH PEKING. TOPIC RAISED IN CONTEXT OF COMMENT ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND COVERED POINTS OUTLINED IN DAR 605.

2. NYERERE OBSERVED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION CHINESE SIMILARLY DESIRED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US AND THEIR DESIRE WAS "QUITE GENUINE." HE FORMED THIS IMPRESSION WHEN HE VISITED CHINA IN 1965, AND HE RECALLED HAVING LEARNED CONFIDENTIALLY SOMETIME LATER WHEN PRESIDENT AYUB OF PAKISTAN WAS PLANNING TO VISIT US--HE THOUGHT IT WAS IN 1966--THAT CHINESE HAD DELIBERATELY MADE CERTAIN POINTS TO AYUB IN EXPECTATION HE WOULD CONVEY THEM TO WASHINGTON. AS IT TURNED OUT, AYUB DID NOT MAKE TRIP, AND NYERERE DID NOT KNOW IF AND HOW CHINESE VIEWS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED.

3. NYERERE ALSO SAID HE FELT CHINESE WERE MORE NERVOUS ABUT US THAN WE WERE ABOUT CHINESE. IMPLICATION WAS CHINESE HAD MORE REASON TO BE NERVOUS, GIVEN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN TAIWAN WHICH NYERERE LIKENED TO CUBA AND AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PRESENCE THERE.

4. COMMENT: THOUGH NYERERE MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00652 091103Z

INTEREST, I BELIEVE EXERCISE WAS WORTHWHILE.
GIVEN HIS CONTACTS WITH CHINESE AND HIS SYMPATHETIC
ATTITUDE TOWARD THEIR ENTRY INTO UN AND ACCEPTANCE BY
WORLD COMMUNITY GENERALLLY, IT IS USEFUL FROM STANDPOINT
OF US-TANZANIAN UNDERSTANDING FOR HIM TO KNOW OF US
DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH PEKING. MOREOVER,
SHOULD SUBJECT OF US ATTITUDES ARISE IN ANY OF HIS
CONTACTS WITH CHINESE HERE, HE IS IN POSITION NOW, IF
HE WISHES, TO PASS ALONG CONTENT OF OUR CONVERSATION.
GP-3
ROSS

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

1-E0 | E0 | SHLO

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 050

PAGE 01 DAR ES 00605 031318Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

P 030858Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9002

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 MAR 3 PM 4:55

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 605

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH NYERERE: US CHINA POLICY

REF: JENKINS TO KREISBERG OFFICIAL-INFORMAL OCT 26, 1970

1. I HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT FOR THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING THOSE NOTED STATE 33578, BUT BELIEVE THIS MAY BE USEFUL OCCASION ON WHICH TO REFER TO US GENERAL INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH PEKING, SUBJECT I HAVE NOT HITHERTO DISCUSSED WITH NYERERE. PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT PROVIDES HELPFUL PEG (CHINA ASPECTS WERE REPORTED PROMINENTLY AND OBJECTIVELY IN STANDARD LAST WEEK).

2. I WOULD NOTE THAT US AWARE OF MANY OBSTACLES AND PROBLEMS IN MOVING TOWARD BETTER SINO-US RELATIONS BUT OBSERVE THAT WE FELT DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WE HAD BEEN HAVING WITH CHINESE IN WARSAW, PARTICULARLY AT BEGINNING 1970, HELD PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS. I WOULD EXPRESS REGRET THAT CHINESE HAD INTERRUPTED THESE DISCUSSIONS LAST MAY AND HAD NOT INDICATED INTEREST IN RESUMING THEM THUS FAR ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL TO DO SO.

3. I WOULD FINALLY OBSERVE THAT I WAS RAISING THIS ISSUE AT CURRENT TIME BECAUSE OF US AWARENESS OF TANZANIAN WISH TO MAINTAIN FRIENDSHIP WITH BOTH PEKING AND US AND MY DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT NYERERE AWARE THAT US DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINESE AND FOR RENEWED CONTACT THROUGH DISCUSSIONS COMPLETELY SINCERE AND THAT US PREPARED MEET AT ANY TIME AND ANY MUTUALLY AGREEABLE PLACE WITH CHINESE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 00605 031318Z

4. I BELIEVE NYERERE WOULD PROBABLY LIMIT HIMSELF TO LISTENING WITHOUT COMMENT TO MY REMARKS BUT THAT HE MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY TAKE OCCASION TO REFER TO MY REMARKS IN CONVERSATION WITH CHINESE. IF HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER WE MINDED HIM MENTIONING MY REMARKS TO CHINESE I WOULD DEFER TO HIS OWN JUDGMENT.

5. I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT RESPONSE BY IMMEDIATE MESSAGE WHETHER ANY OBJECTION PERCEIVED TO RAISING CHINA POLICY WITH NYERERE AND ANY SUGGESTIONS DEPT MAY HAVE ON PROJECTED APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE. GP-3
ROSS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

e eo/ eo/ SHLO

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 208

PAGE 01 DAR ES 03126 311815Z

45
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01 /046 W

---------- 047894

R 311317Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6902

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 3126

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS

REF: STATE 184401

1. CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF PARA 2 REFTEL TO MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MHANDO TODAY. HE EXPREESED GRATITUDE FOR OUR CONTINUING TO KEEP PRESIDENT INFORMED ON RELIEF EFFORTS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY INFORMATION TO NYERERE TOMORROW MORNING. (NYERERE RETURNING TO DAR THIS AFTERNOON FROM TRIP UP COUNTRY.)

2. MHANDO VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESIDENT WILL BE AVILABLE AT ANY TIME TO DIECUSS MATTER FURTHER IF NEW FACTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION. I TOLD HIM I HAD NOTHING AT MOMENT TO ADD TO WHAT I HAD JUST TOLD HIM, BUT THAT I WOULD OF COURSE NOTIFY HIM IMMEDIATELY IF SOMETHING NEW DEVELOPS. GP-1.
MATLOCK

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'69 OCT 31 PM 4:06

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 129 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 ZANZIB 00012 050653Z

10
ACTION AF-05

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 EUR-12 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 RSR-01 RSC-01 /059 W
---------- 006695

R 040800Z JAN 70
FM AMCONSUL ZANZIBAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 708
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

S E C R E T ZANZIBAR 012

LIMDIS

REF: ABZ-732

1. REFERENCED MESSAGE DEALS WITH REPORT THAT ARMY OFFICERS LED BY TPDF(Z) COMMANDER YUSUF HIMIDI WITH ASSISTANCE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS WERE PLANNING COUP TO OUST FIRST VICE PRESIDENT KARUME, MINISTER OF STATE ABOUD JUMBE AND COMMISSIONER POLICE EDDINGTON KISSASSI, AND TO REPLACE THEM WITH MILITARY JUNTA HEADED BY HIMIDI; THAT COUP WAS TO TAKE PLACE ZANZIBAR REVOLUTION DAY JAN 12; THAT KISSASSI DISCOVERED PLOT IN EARLY DECEMBER AND REPORTED IT TO KARUME, WHO CONFRONTED HIMIDI WITH ACCUSATION BEFORE SPECIAL COURT; AND THAT KISSASSI IS CONFIDENT HE HAS EITHER NEUTRALIZED THREAT OF COUP OR CAN FOIL IT IF IT IS ATTEMPTED.

2. IN ASSESSING REPORT, IT NECESSARY TO KEEP SEVERAL POINTS IN MIND:

A. KISSASSI, WHO ALLEGEDLY DISCOVERED PLOT, IS LONG AND BITTER ENEMY OF HIMIDI, THE ALLEGED PLOTTER. WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT THEY ARE MUTUALLY ANXIOUS TO DO EACH OTHER IN. APPARENT EASE WITH WHICH KISSASSI EXPOSED PLOT AND LATER CARELESSNESS HE SHOWED IN LETTING HIS INFORMANTS FALL INTO PLOTTERS HANDS RINGS FALSE.

B. RAMADHAN HAJI, WHO ALLEGEDLY ONE OF RINGLEADERS OF

COUP PLOT, HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY REPORTED BY MOST SOURCES AS PERSONALLY LOYAL TO KARUME.

C. PURPOSE OF COUP, TO REPLACE KARUME AND TWO CLOSE ADVISORS WITH MILITARY JUNTA, APPARENTLY ASSUMES THAT REMAINDER OF REVCO WOULD ACCEPT JUNTA LEADERSHIP WITHOUT RESISTANCE.

D. ALLEGED PLOTTERS APPEAR TO HAVE NAIVELY FAILED TO CONSIDER REACTION OF MAINLAND GOVERNMENT TO ANY ATTEMPT TO OUST KARUME AND JUMBE WHO, AFTER ALL, ARE HIGH-LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS.

E. REPORTED INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN ZANZIBAR, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE CREDIBLE TO KARUME, SEEMS UNLIKELY IN SPITE OF THEIR APPARENT CONCERN OVER WHAT THEY REGARD AS CHICOM PENETRATION OF TANZANIA. WHILE SOVIETS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SEEING RISE OF REGIME IN ZANZIBAR WHICH IN THEIR OPINION WOULD BE LESS SUBJECT TO CHICOM INFLUENCE, HARD TO SEE HOW REPLACING KARUME WOULD SERVE THIS INTEREST.

F. KISSASSI'S CONFIDENCE THAT THREE ARMY COMMANDERS WOULD REMAIN "LOYAL" IMPLIES THAT HIMIDI AND OTHERS PLANNED MILITARY COUP WITHOUT ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT FROM KEY MILITARY PERSONNEL, WHICH SEEMS UNLIKELY.

G. KARUME, IF HE TOOK KISSASSI'S ACCUSATIONS SERIOUSLY, WAS INDEED FOOLISH IN CONFRONTING HIMIDI BEFORE SPECIAL COURT ON WHICH ALL ALLEGED PLOTTERS SERVE. BOTH KARUME AND KISSASSI WOULD HAVE BEEN DOUBLY FOOLISH TO EXPOSE THEIR INFORMANTS TO MAKUNGU'S SECURITY APPARATUS.

H. FINALLY, TIMING OF COUP ATTEMPT FOR JAN 12, WHEN NYERERE, OTHER UNION OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF MANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES WOULD BE PRESENT FOR REVOLUTION DAY CEREMONIES, SEEMS INAUSPICIOUS. RUMORS OF COUPS OFTEN CROP UP AROUND REVOLUTION DAY, USUALLY BASED ON PREMISE THAT ALL REVCO MEMBERS WILL BE TOGETHER IN ONE PLACE AT SAME TIME AND THUS EASILY ARRESTED OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF. IN FACT, MOST REVCO MEMBERS MEET TOGETHER MANY TIMES A YEAR, AND PARTICULAR THREE MEMBERS AT WHICH THIS ALLEGED

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

PLOT AIMED MEET TOGETHER EVEN MORE OFTEN.

3. ALTHOUGH REPORT OF COUP PLOT AND WAY IT WAS HANDLED BY KARUME AND KISSASSI APPEARS TO BE IMPLAUSIBLE AND INCONSISTENT WITH FEW KNOWN FACTS, WE ARE NOT WELL ENOUGH INFORMED TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT SUCH A PLOT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FORMULATED. ALLEGED RINGLEADERS, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF RAMADHAN HAJI, ARE BELIEVED TO BE UNSCRUPULOUS, POWER HUNGRY, AND, IN CASE OF HIMIDI, HATEFUL TOWARD KARUME. NEVERTHELESS, THEY SHOULD BY NOW HAVE DEVELOPED A STRONG SENSE OF SELF-PRESERVATION WHICH WOULD HAVE KEPT THEM FROM ENTERING INTO A PLOT WITH SUCH AMBIGUOUS AIMS, SO EASILY REVEALED, AND SO LITTLE ASSURED OF SUCCESS.

4. IF KISSASSI TRYING TO FRAME HIMIDI, AS LATTER REPORTEDLY CLAIMS, IT EXTREMELY RISKY THING TO ATTEMPT. IT IS DOUBTFUL, THOUGH NOT INCONCEIVABLE, THAT KISSASSI WOULD TAKE THAT RISK WITHOUT VERY GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESS OR EXPECTATION OF IMMUNITY IN CASE OF FAILURE. HOWEVER KARUME AND REVCO RESOLVE CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES, INCREASED BAD BLOOD BETWEEN KISSASSI AND HIMIDI AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SUPPORTERS SEEMS INEVITABLE. GP-2
HAUGHT

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 931

PAGE 01 DAR ES 03053 01 OF 02 241520Z

52
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01 /046 W

---------- 002764

R 241224Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6872

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 3053

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJECT: ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS

REF: STATE 178471

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING. WHAT I HAD ASSUMED WOULD BE BRIEF CALL TURNED INTO 30 MINUTE DISCUSSION OF BIAFRAN RELIEF PROBLEMS, WITH PRESIDENT DOING MOST OF TALKING. AFTER EXPRESSING OUR APPRECIATION FOR HIS CONVERSATION WITH AMB LEONHART, I CONVEYED MESSAGE IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REFTEL, STRESSING THAT WE CONSIDERED IT VERY SENSITIVE MATTER AND I UNDERSTOOD THAT, BESIDES PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED, WE INFORMING ONLY HIMSELF AND EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA.

2. NYERERE FIRST SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED OUR EFFORTS TO GET RELIEF OPERATIONS UNDER WAY AND OUR CONSIDERATION IN KEEPING HIM INFORMED. HE SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS IN CANADA, CANADIANS HAD DISCUSSED ICRC FLIGHTS WITH HIM AND HAD PLEADED WITH HIM TO LEND HIS SUPPORT TO DAY-LIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD AGREED TO DO SO, AND WHEN HE TRANSITED NEW YORK EN ROUTE TO SWEDEN HE GAVE BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVE MESSAGE FOR OJUKWU. UPON HIS RETURN TO DAR HE CONTINUED DISCUSSION WITH BIAFRANS HERE. BIAFRANS EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT IN THEIR DESPERATE SITUATION THEY MUST BALANCE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF ICRC DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS WITH POTENTIAL DAMAGE. HE WAS TOLD THAT FMG AGREEMENT WITH ICRC WAS FOR MAXIMUM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 03053 01 OF 02 241520Z

OF SIX FLIGHTS DAILY BETWEEN HOURS OF 9:00 A.M. AND 6:00 P.M., AND THAT AGREEMENT SPECIFIED FURTHER THAT FLIGHTS "CONTINGENT UPON MILITARY OPERATIONS." BIAFRANS EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT FOOD NOW COMING IN BY NIGHT FLIGHTS AND THAT "THEORETICALLY" 20-30 FLIGHTS A NIGHT COULD BE MADE TO ULI. BIAFRA, THEREFORE, BEING ASKED TO RISK LOSS OF ONE REMAINING AIRSTRIP FOR MERE SIX FLIGHTS DAILY. BIAFRANS HAD POINTED OUT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT FMG COULD REFRAIN FROM ATTACKS ON ULI DURING HOURS OF RELIEF FLIGHTS, YET BOMB FIELD AT 6:05 P.M.

3. HAVING EXPLAINED BIAFRAN POSITION AS PRESENTED TO HIM, NYERERE SAID THAT HE MUST ASK HIMSELF WHETHER HE COULD IN CONSCIENCE JOIN THOSE PUTTING MORAL PRESSURE ON BIAFRAN LEADERS TO ACCEPT ICRC DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS. "THEY ARE BEING PRESSED BEYOND HUMAN ENDURANCE," HE SAID. "THEY ARE DYING AND YET ARE BEING CONDEMNED BY WORLD FOR DENYING FOOD TO THEIR PEOPLE WHO ARE STARVING." HE SAID THAT BY HIS MESSAGE TO OJUKWU FROM NEW YORK HE HIMSELF HAD ADDED TO THIS MORAL PRESSURE, AND HE MUST SORT OUT ISSUES IN HIS OWN MIND BEFORE MAKING ANOTHER APPEAL.

4. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TROUBLING HIM, HE EXPLAINED, ARE FOLLOWING. (1) IS THERE NO USUABLE AIRSTRIP IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY BIAFRA EXCEPT ULI? IF NOT WHY ARE RELIEF AGENCIES, OR INTERESTED COUNTRIES LIKE US, NOT ABLE TO CLEAR ANOTHER STRIP FOR DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS? HE POINTED OUT THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON ICRC FLIGHTS HAVE CONTINUED NOW FOR FOUR MONTHS AND OBSERVED THAT SURELY ANOTHER AIRSTRIP COULD HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED DURING THIS PERIOD. (2) WHY IS FMG SO RELUCTANT TO GRANT TEMPORARY CEASE FIRE TO ALLOW FULL-SCALE RELIEF OPERATIONS FOR, SAY, TWO WEEKS? HE AWARE OF FMG ARGUMENT THAT BIAFRANS WOULD USE CEASE FIRE TO MILITARY ADVANTAGE, BUT DISMISSED IT SAYING, "BIAFRANS ARE DEFEATED AND PROBLEM NOW IS HO TO KEEP THEM ALIVE."

5. I TOLD NYERERE I UNABLE ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS WITH ANY AUTHORITY, BUT MY PERSONAL IMPRESSION IS THAT ULI IS ONLY LANDING FACILITY IN BIAFRAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION AND ASSUME THAT CONSTRUCTION

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 DAR ES 03053 01 OF 02 241520Z

NEW FIELD EITHER NOT FEASIBLE OR WOULD INVOLVE SUCH DELAY THAT IT COULD NOT SOLVE URGENT RELIEF PROBLEM THAT EXISTS TODAY. ON QUESTION OF CEASE FIRE, SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO ME THAT FMG HAS BEEN PRESSED AS FAR AS IT WILLING TO GO IN AGREEING TO ICRC DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 928

PAGE 01 DAR ES 03053 02 OF 02 241520Z

51
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01 /046 W

---------- 002770

R 241224Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6873

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 3053

EXDIS

I STRESSED THAT I NOT COMPETENT TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS BUT WOULD SEEK ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THEM IF HE DESIRED. NYERERE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT COULD BE PROVIDED AND EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS SIMPLY THINKING ALOUD IN POSING QUESTIONS, IN ORDER TO INDICATE CONSIDERATIONS HE FELT HE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING WHETHER TO ADDRESS ANOTHER APPEAL TO OJUKWU.

6. COMMENT: NYERERE IS OBVIOUSLY IN DEEP MORAL QUANDARY AS TO WHETHER HE SHOULD ADD HIS VOICE TO THOSE URGING BIAFRAN LEADERS ACCEPT ICRC DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS. THOUGH HEEXPOUNDED BIAFRAN POSITION IN DETAIL, MY IMPRESSION IS THAT HE IS BY NO MEANS CONVINCED THAT BIAFRAN ARGUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR REJECTING FLIGHTS. HE FEELS THAT BIAFRAN LEADERS ARE UNDER INHUMAN PRESSURE AT MOMENT, HOWEVER, AND IS RELUCTANT TO DO ANYTHING TO INTENSIFY THIS PRESSURE UNLESS HE IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT HIS INTERVENTION WOULD BE IN BEST INTERESTS OF BIAFRANS.

7. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE WHATEVER INFORMATION WE CAN DO TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN IN NYERERE'S MIND. MATERIAL WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL WOULD BE:
A. TEXT OF ICRC AGREEMENT WITH FMG, WITH EXPLANATION OF ANY UNDERTAKINGS BY FMG NOT TO TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS, INTERPRETATION OF PHRASE (IF SUCH EXISTS IN AGREEMENT) THAT RELIEF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 03053 02 OF 02 241520Z

FLIGHTS "CONTINGENT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS," AND
CLARIFICATION OF WHETHER AGREEMENT WOULD PRECLUDE ATTACKS
ON ULI DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS WHEN RELIEF OPERATIONS
NOT IN PROGRESS.
B. NATURE OF ANY PRIVATE ASSURANCES THAT WE OR
OTHERS HAVE RECEIVED FROM FMG IN THIS REGARD.
C. EXPLANATION OF SITUATION REGARDING LANDING
FACILITIES IN BIAFRAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY, WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING
ADDITIONAL STRIP.
D. DETAILS ON EFFORTS MADE TO SECURE FMG AGREEMENT
TO TEMPORARY CEASE FIRE TO PERMIT MASSIVE RELIEF OPERATION.
(MY IMPRESSION IS THAT NYERERE DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS
REALISTIC POSSIBILITY, BUT MENTIONED IT AS EXAMPLE
OF ARRANGEMENT WHICH SHOULD BE POSSIBLE IF FMG
GENUINELY WISHES TO MINIMIZE BIAFRAN STARVATION.)

8. SUGGEST THAT ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEPT WISHES
PRESENT TO NYERERE BE CONVEYED BY LETTER, OR VERBALLY
TO MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MHANDO. GP-1
MATLOCK

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUC WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SEO/EO/SNLO

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 032

PAGE 01 DAR ES 03024 221307Z

53
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,/046 W
---------- 118268

P 221100Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6860

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 3024

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS

REF: STATE 178471

1. HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH NYERERE "TO CONVEY MESSAGE FROM MY GOVERNMENT CONCERNING ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS." CHIEF OF PROTOCOL MFINANGA SUGGESTED THAT MESSAGE BE DELIVERED TO MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MHANDO, BUT I REPLIED THAT SINCE MATTER FOLLOWS UP ON CONVERSATION OF PRESIDENT WITH AMBASSADOR LEONHART, I BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT DIRECT. MFINANGA AGREED TO TRRY ARRANGE APPOINTMENT.

2. IF APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT NOT POSSIBLE, SHOULD MESSAGE BE CONVEYED TO MHANDO? GP-2
MATLOCK

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'69 OCT 22 AM 11:40

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 937

PAGE 01 STATE 066374

60
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:DHSHINN:CHR
4/17/72 EXT 23355
APPROVED BY AF:CRMOORE
AF/E:HRMELONE
L/C:DRHENDERSON
S/S:O-SEFRY
--- 054981

P R 180143Z APR 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 066374

EXDIS

SUBJECT: STROH/SIEDLE CASE
REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 985 (B) KAMPALA 1079

1. ASSUMPTION CONTAINED PARA 3 REF (A) IS CORRECT. EMBASSY SHOULD RECEIVE DEPOSITION FROM MARTIN FOR TRANSMISSION TO KAMPALA.

2. IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S CRITICISM OF JONES COMMISSION FOR "WORKING SECRETLY" AS REPORTED REF (B), DEPT URGES THAT EMBASSIES CONTINUE HANDLE DEPOSITION MATTER WITH UTMOST DISCRETION. EMBASSY DAR SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE TO MARTIN SENSITIVITY CONCERNING USE OF OUR POUCH FACILITY AND FACT THAT IT MUST NOT BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF GOU.
ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 136

PAGE 01 STATE 064426

45
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:DHSHINN:CHR
4/14/72 EXT 23355
APPROVED BY AF:CRMOORE
AF/E:HRMELONE
L/C:RDHENDERSON
S/S-RHMILLER

--- 035382

O 141732Z APR 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 064426

EXDIS

SUBJECT: STROH/SIEDLE CASE
REF: KAMPALA 1070
DEPT. AUTHORIZES TRANSMISSION OF DEPOSITION VIA OUR POUCH. REQUEST DEPOSITION BE DELIVERED BY WILKINSON PERSONALLY TO EMBASSY DAR OFFICER AND THAT IT ALSO BE HANDED BY EMBASSY KAMPALA OFFICER TO WILKINSON UPON HIS RETURN TO KAMPALA. DOCUMENT SHOULD SHOW NO INDICATION IT WENT THROUGH OUR POUCH.
GR-3. JOHNSON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 941

PAGE 01 STATE 036080

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66643
DRAFTED BY: EA/ACA:WABROWN
APPROVED BY: EA:MARSHALL GREEN
AF/E: MR COOTE (SUBS)
S/S-O: MR BRIMS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 MAR 4 AM 8:24
2

093746

O 032347Z MAR 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 036080

EXDIS

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 605

CONCUR IN YOUR PROPOSED REMARKS TO NYERERE IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT. IF THIS LEADS TO NYERERE OFFERING VIEWS ON CURRENT CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS US, THEIR REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT, THEIR OUTLOOK ON INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RESUME SINO-US DIALOGUE, SO MUCH THE BETTER. HOWEVER, WE WISH TO AVOID NYERERE GAINING IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PRESSING TO RENEW THE DIALOGUE OR SOLICIT CHINES VIEWS. GP-3 ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 848

PAGE 01 STATE 020949

3

53
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 R

66635
DRAFTED BY: AF/E:WBCOOTE
APPROVED BY: AF-DAVIDD.NEWSOM
H-KRIZEK
S/S-O:GLRUECKERT
------------------------ 038627

O 061739Z FEB 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 020949

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: CODEL MCGEE

REF: LUSAKA 259, DAR 371

REQUEST YOU CLARIFY IMMEDIATELY WITH MIKE SAMUELS APPARENT CONTRADICTION PARA ONE LUSAKA REFTEL AND DAR REFTEL. UPON RECEIPT YOUR RESPONSE DEPT WILL ADVISE.

GP-3 ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

24

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 823

PAGE 01 STATE 171293

85
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 CPR-04 NSC-10 NSCE-00 SS-20 P-03 PRS-01

USIA-12 CIAE-00 INR-08 NSAE-00 RSC-01 /091 R

66634
DRAFTED BY: AF EGLKINTER
APPROVED BY AF WBEVERLY CARTER, JR.
AF/E - MR. COOTE AMB ROSS (DRAFT)
AF P - MR. BARR (DRAFT)
S UN - MR. BROWN (DRAFT)
S S - MR. CURRAN
WHITE HOUSE MR. 248&#5
S PRS - MR. KING
S CPR - MR. SMOAK

---------- 093703

P R 162252Z OCT 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 171293

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR MELADY

SUBJECT: NYERERE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION FOR 10:30 AM OCTOBER 16 CALL AT WHITE HOUS RELAYED TO NYERERE'S ADVISERS IN NYC OCTOBER 14.

2. TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR RUTABANZIBWA ADVISED DEPT MORNING OCTOBER 15 THAT HIS PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE INVITATION BUT REGRETTED HE WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT. AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT TANZANIANS HAD WANTED APPOINTMENT AT QUOTE MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME UNQUOTE AND THAT REGRETTABLY TIME SUGGESTED NOT CONVENIENT TO THEM BECAUSE IT CONFLUCTED WITH OTHER NYERERE APPOINTMENTS IN NYC.

CONFIDENTIAL

46

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 171293

3. CONTRARY TO EARLY IMPRESSIONS, IT NOW APPEARS THAT NYERERE'S DECLINATION WHITE HOUSE INVITATION NOT RPT NOT RESULT ANY PIQUE, BUT BECAUSE NYERERE DID NOT FEEL HE COULD ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR SUCH AN IMPORTANT MEETING ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE WHILE AT SAME TIME MAINTAINING HEAVY YEW YORK SCHEDULE. NYERERE HAS STRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT'S INVITATION.

4. IF ASKED WHY VISIT FELL THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN WILL REPLY ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT HAD INVITED PRESIDENT NYERERE TO CALL ON HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME FOR THE VISIT. UNQUOTE.

5. EMBASSY SHOULD TAKE SIMILAR POSITION IN REPLYING POSSIBLE QUERIES IN DAR ES SALAAM. IRWIN

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 421

PAGE 01 STATE 171365

12
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 CPR-04 PM-05 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 SS-20 USIA-12

PRS-01 /075 R

66633
DRAFTED BY:AF/N:ALLOWRIE
APPROVED BY:AF/N:JAMES J. BLAKE
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS SUBS
S/S-MR. CURRAN

094911

R 162316Z OCT 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 171365

1. PRESIDENT SIGNED LETTER TO BOUMEDIENE OCTOBER 16 AND IT POUCHED TO YOU OCTOBER 17.

2. SOME WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE TO ZEGHAR WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN NEXT FEW DAYS. IRWIN

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 954

PAGE 01 STATE 184401

82
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01 /046 R

66633
DRAFTED BY:AF/SN:HKWALKER
APPROVED BY:DAVID D. NEWSOM
AF/E:MR. MARKS U/CF:HBSHISHKIN S/S:MR. GLEYSTEEN
042122

R 310122Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

S E C R E T STATE 184401

EXDIS

SUBJ: ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 3053 AND STATE 178471

1. CONCUR USEFULNESS OF KEEPING NYERERE'S INTEREST ENGAGED ON MATERS REPORTED REFTEL. ALTHOUGH BIAFRANS DID NOT ACCEPT AGREEMENT DURING RECENT ICRC REPS VISIT, ICRC TRYING TO KEEP ISSUE ALIVE BY TAKING POSITION BIAFRANS DID NOT TOTALLY REJECT IT EITHER. HENCE, USEFUL GET BIAFRA'S FRIENDS KEEP PRESSURE ON.

2. RE NYERERE'S QUESTIONS PARA 7 REFTEL, YOU SHOULD REPLY ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) WE HAVE NO OFFICIAL TEXT ICRC-FMG AGREEMENT AND CANNOT OF COURSE SPEAK FOR EITHER PARTY ABOUT SPECIAL UNDERTAKINGS OR INTERPRETATIONS OF AGREEMENT WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN MADE. HOWEVER, BOTH FMG AND BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES HAVE INSISTED THAT AGREEMENT BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR OWN MILITARY OPERATIONS. OUR UNDERSTANDING THIS RESERVATION BY FMG REFERS TO MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND, NOT IN THE AIR AND BY BIAFRANS REFERS TO MILITARY USE ULI OUTSIDE HOURS OF DALIGHT RELIEF. WE SUFFICIENTLY CONVINCED OF FMG PROMISE NOT TO TAKE MILITARY AIR ADVANTAGE OF AGREEMENT THAT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

46

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 184401

SECRETARY MADE PUBLIC STATEMENT IN SEPTEMBER WHICH INTER ALIA NOTED FMG PROMISE AND WARNED OF WORLD OPPROBRIUM IF EITHER PARTY VIOLATED. US PROPOSAL YOU DISCUSSED WITH NYERERE (STATE 178471) IS EVEN MORE FORCEFUL U.S. ASSURANCE. BIAFRAN RESERVATION PERHAPS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS DESIRE CONTINUE ARMS SHIPMENTS THROUGH ULI UNDER COVER NIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

(B) RE POSSIBILITIES ALTERNATIVE LANDING STRIP WITHIN ENCLAVE, THERE IS ONE OTHER AIRSTRIP BUT IT CANNOT TAKE HEAVY AIRCRAFT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ASIDE FROM SERIOUS OBJECTIONS FMG WOULD HAVE TO CONSTRUCTION NEW AIRSTRIP WHICH IT WOULD VIEW AS MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO SECESSIONISTS, RELIEF GROUPS HAVE BEEN UNWILLING USE RELIEF FLIGHTS FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS AT HEAVY SACRIFICE RELIEF SUPPLIES WHICH THEY CONSIDER THEIR RAISON D'ETRE.

(C) RE TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE, OUR IMPRESSION FMG CONSIDERS IT TO BE NOT REPEAT NOT AN ISSUE RELATED TO RELIEF BUT A MILITARY AND POLITICAL ISSUE WHICH WOULD GIVE BIAFRANS MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGES. FMG FEELS IT ALREADY MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS AND INDICATED GENUINE WISH MINIMIZE BIAFRAN STARVATION VIA ICRC AGREEMENT AND IF BIAFRAN LEADERS GENUINELY INTERESTED PLIGHT OF SICK AND HUNGRY, THEY WOULD ACCEPT THAT AGREEMENT.
ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 667

PAGE 01 STATE 178898

83
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01 /046 R

66635
DRAFTED BY: AF/SN:GBSHERRY
APPROVED BY: AF/SN:WILLIAM H. BRUBECK
AF/E:MR. BEYER
S/S:MR. BROWN
---------- 120659

R 221945Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

S E C R E T STATE 178898

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 3024

IF YOU NOT ABLE SEE NYERERE BY ALL MEANS CONVEY MESSAGE TO MHANDO AS WE DESIRE ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM TANZANIAN COOPERATION.
ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 090

PAGE 01 STATE 178471

8 02
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01 /046 R

66640
DRAFTED BY:AF/SN:WH BRUBECK
APPROVED BY:AMB. NEWSOM
U/CF:MR. FOLEY
S/S:MR. BROWN
AF/E:MR. BEYER

---------- 114596

R 212218Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 178471

EXDIS

REF: BELGRADE 3376

SUBJ: ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS

ABIDJAN FOR FERGUSON

1. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO NYERERE OUR APPRECIATION HIS CONVERSATION WITH AMB LEONHART AND OFFER TO FILL HIM IN OUR EFFORTS RE ICRC DAYLIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES.

2. AMB FERGUSON NOW ON TRIP WEST AFRICA ON PROBLEMS OF RELIEF PROGRAM. AMONG HIS PURPOSES IS EXPLORE WHAT CAN BE DONE HELP SOLVE PRESENT IMPASSE OVER ICRC AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS DEALING WITH CERTAIN IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ON ONGOING RELIEF PROGRAMS.

3. WE ALSO IN COMMUNICATION WITH BIAFRANS, ATTEMPTING TO MEET THEIR CONCERN OVER SECURITY ASPECTS ICRC PROGRAM. WE OFFERING,

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 178471

IF BIAFRANS AGREE ACCEPT PROGRAM, TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT OF US CONFIDENCE IN NIGERIAN GOOD FAITH IN PROMISING NO MILITARY VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT. WE REGARD THIS AS NEAREST TO QTE THIRD PARTY GUARANTEE END QTE BIAFRANS CAN REASONABLY ASK. YOU CAN TELL NYERERE IN VIEW ASSURANCES FROM US AND OTHERS, AND EFFORTS MADE BY ICRC TO MEET BIAFRAN SECURITY CONCERN BY POSSIBLE USE OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, WE FIND DIFFICULT UNDERSTAND INSISTENCE ON THIRD PARTY GUARANTEES AT EXPENSE OF RELIEF FOR BIAFRAN PEOPLE.

4. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE RE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WHILE WE WANT TO BE HELPFUL, WE REGARD AS AFRICAN PROBLEM AND NOT APPROPRIATE FOR US TO INTERVENE. WE APPRECIATE RECEIVING NYERERE EXPRESSION OF VIEWS AND FULLY SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

5. FOR ADDIS - EMBASSY MAY DRAW ON ABOVE TO INFORM EMPEROR OUR CURRENT INITIATIVE NOTING THAT THIS VERY SENSITIVE MATTER. HOWEVER, WE HAVE INFORMED BOTH GOWON AND NYERERE.
ROGERS

SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Ed. Tanzania

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 340

PAGE 01 STATE 101006

16
ORIGIN SS 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00 /071 R

DRAFTED BY: ALAN LOGAN, AF/E
APPROVED BY: CRMOORE, AF
RAREMOLE, AFE/E
MR. WILL (DRAFT), AF/I
MR. WALSH, SS
MR. KING (DRAFT), SS/CPR
MR. WITMAN, AF/I
MR. MORRIS, WHITE HOUSE
---------- 124798

R 192225Z JUN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
INFO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 101006

LIMDIS

REF: DAR-ES-SALAAM 1808

1. TANZANIA CHARGE TOLD DEPTOFF JUNE 17 THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY HIS GOVERNMENT THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE WILL BE VISITING CANADA AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER AND THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. FOLLOWING THIS VISIT, NYERERE PLANS TO COME TO THE US WHERE HE WILL ATTEND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON PRESIDENT NIXON.

2. CHARGE STATED THAT HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO USG AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE AGREEABLE AND WHETHER A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

3. DEPTOFF SAID THAT HE WOULD INFORM APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS AND INFORM CHARGE AS SOON AS RESPONSE TO TAN. GOVT QUERY RECEIVED.

4. FYI. VISITS OF FOREIGN CHIEFS OF STATE BEING PARED TO MINIMUM AND SCHEDULE FOR SECOND HALF OF 1969 STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 101006

QUITE POSSIBLY CHIEFS OF STATE ATTENDING UNGA WILL BE HANDLED AS A SEPARATE CATEGORY AND IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE IN POSITION TO REPLY TO TANGOVT INQUIRY.

ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET/NOFORN

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 747

PAGE 01 STATE 061648

89
ORIGIN CPR 02

INFO AF 12,JPM 04,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,USIA 12,SSC 01,/066 R

66633
DRAFTED BY: S/CPR: DMJOHNSON
APPROVED BY: CHIEF OF PROTOCOL: EMOSBACHER JR
AF/E: MR LOGAN
AF: MR QUIMBY
WH: MR MORRIS
S/S: MR BROWN
S/S-C: MRS DENHAM

---------- 002355

R 220037Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 061648

FYI FOL MSG WILL BE SENT DIRECT VIA COMMERCIAL CHANNELS TO PRES NYERERE ON APRIL 25. QTE ON THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNION I WISH TO EXPRESS THE BEST WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MY OWN PERSONAL GREETINGS TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA. MAY OUR TIES OF MUTUAL TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING BE STRENGTHENED FROM YEAR TO YEAR. RICHARD NIXON. UNQTE.

DEPT WILL RELEASE UPON CONFIRMATION BY EMB OF RECEIPT BY PRES UNLESS OBJECTION PERCEIVED. ROGERS

NODIS NODIS NODIS

WH

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Tanganyika defense

0945Q
1971 AUG 4 1320Z

8

R 040830Z AUG 71
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9698
BT
S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 2159

NODIS

SUBJ: NYERERE COMMENT ON CHINA

REF: STATE 135864

1. ACCORDING TO GERMAN EMBASSY HERE, DURING CONVERSATION BETWEEN FRG FINANCE MIN EPPLER AND NYERERE JULY 25, NYERERE INITIATED DISCUSSION WITH EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN PRES NIXON'S PLAN TO VISIT PEKING AND QUERY AS TO FRG ATTITUDE. EPPLER SAID GERMANS WERE STILL INVOLVED WITH SOLUTION OF BERLIN PROBLEM AND NO LONGER BELIEVED THAT NOTHING COULD HAPPEN IN WORLD WITHOUT GERMAN CONSENT. NYERERE SAID US WOULD HAVE TO RESOLVE PROBLEM OF TAIWAN AND MUSED THAT PERHAPS ULTIMATELY TAIWAN MIGHT BECOME "SOMETHING LIKE ANOTHER HONG KONG".

2. COMMENT: CONCEIVEABLY REFERENCE TO "HONG KONG" LIKE TAIWAN INTENDED TO INDICATE AN AREA WHICH MIGHT HAVE DISTINCT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EXISTENCE BUT WHICH NEVERTHELESS NOMINALLY UNDER PRC SOVEREIGNTY AND ULTIMATELY (IN SOME FUTURE TIME FRAME) DESTINED RETURN TO DIRECT RULE FROM PEKING. IMPLICATION CERTAINLY THAT SOLUTION WILL BE PROLONGED AND THAT NYERERE NOT PARTICULARLY EXERCISED OVER THIS FACT.

3. MOST INTERESTING QUESTION, OF COURSE, AND ONE WHICH GERMANS DID NOT PURSUE IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS, IS WHETHER HONG KONG ANALOGY SUGGESTED TO NYERERE BY CHINESE THEMSELVES OR REPRESENTS HIS OWN IDEA. CONCEIVABLY OPPORTUNITY MAY ARISE IN FUTURE FOR AMBASSADOR TO PROBE THIS FURTHER WITH NYERERE, IF DEPARTMENT WISHES. GP-3

KREISBERG

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CIA

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 38 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 39 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 40 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 41 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.